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Honor: A Philosophically Parsed Assessment of Honor and Arguments Concerning Its Moral 
Functions 
Abstract 
Honor is a concept familiar to many, yet it can be difficult to articulate.  In this thesis, the 
topic of honor is first explored as a philosophical and social structure.  Then, using this structure, 
an ideal conception of honor is argued.  For the formation and support of a functional honor 
theory, major components of honor are defined by examining and integrating the opinions of 
philosophers past and present.  Terms defined include Individual and Group, as well as Internal 
behavior and External behavior.  These establish honor as a mechanism for social motivation, 
because moral values that are idealized in a code of honor incentivize certain types of behavior.  
Next, the arguments for two ideal values for a culture to honor are discussed, followed by a 
response to potential objections.  These two moral values are Personal Responsibility and 
Humility, which are both parsed by Aristotle’s system of lack, mean, and excess.  The 
discussions of these two values overlap to some degree.  Principally, however, Personal 
Responsibility is debated from the perspective of justice theory (such as the one proposed by 
Tamler Sommers in Why Honor Matters), whereas Humility is chiefly discussed within the 
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context of religion (primarily that of Islam).  A recurring theme throughout is the ability of these 
two moral values to compensate for the other’s weaknesses.  All arguments in support of the 
thesis that Personal Responsibility and Humility are the ideal values for a culture to honor are 
measured by a rubric that assesses the practical success of these values.  This criterion is the 
values’ capability to avoid honor violence.   
Introduction: Complex Honor 
Honor is a slippery thing.  It masquerades by many names, past and present, and does not 
mean the same thing in all contexts.  It is seen in literature, religious texts, and epic poems alike.  
Honor presents a unique challenge as a topic of a persuasive essay: it has no singular definition 
that extends much farther than “reputation.”  Thus, any writer attempting to build arguments 
about it must first establish their own foundation of what honor is.  The masked challenge here is 
that it is still up for debate.  For instance, the most recent of my sources is a seven-chapter book 
published in 2018 (Why Honor Matters).  As Frank Henderson Stewart reminds the reader in his 
own book Honor, “It may not be clear why some things count as honor and others do not, why 
certain things are grouped together and others excluded from the grouping” (5).   
It is plain that not only does an author writing about honor need to explore the data 
required for their arguments, but they must also thoroughly examine the philosophical literature 
about honor’s function and structure.  Many have tried their hand at encapsulating what honor is.  
It seems the more one knows about it, the less easily it can be summarized.  Therefore, I am 
arguing doubly: I wish to persuade you of my explanation for honor, and furthermore, I wish to 
succeed in justifying my thesis that is drawn from my epexegesis of honor: Personal 
Responsibility and Humility are the ideal values for a culture to honor.   
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Background: Honor Theory 
To understand the future arguments about honor, one must first understand their 
foundation.  For this essay about “this most elusive of social concepts,” a theory of honor is in 
use that is both self-made and has academically corroborated aspects (qtd. in Stewart 5).  It 
contains the important variable of idealized values, has contemporary relevance, and includes 
semantic nuances.  Each of these topics will be addressed for the sake of well-rounded 
comprehension. 
To set the stage, every concept of honor functions through a code of honor, which is a set 
of behavioral rules determining what is and what is not dubbed “honorable” (Stewart 23-24).  
These rules are extensions of whatever moral values the code of honor esteems.  Next, the 
settings for these codes of honor separate into the Individual and the Group.  “Settings” is a term 
used to describe the two places where codes of honor can be created and followed—within a 
single person, or within a conglomerate of persons.  Honor is inherently social, meaning that for 
any code of honor to work, there must be at least one other person sharing that code who will 
laud another who follows it (Sommers 17; Stewart 24).  (For added complexity, this means that 
religions can allow for highly individualistic honor—a deity can be this praising figure.)  While 
any person can author their own code of honor, it is the popular code of honor that holds the 
most sway.  The subcategories of behavior that these codes of honor can incentivize branch into 
the Internal and the External (these terms will be capitalized for sake of clarity).  Massive 
variation can exist between different codes of honor, sometimes to such a degree that two 
conceptions of honor can appear to not be related at all, but the strength of this proposed theory 
of honor is its capability to provide an explanation for each. 
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Codes of honor, the first cog of honor’s mechanics, are the epitome of what is viewed as 
ideal for emulation.  With more detailed phraseology, a code of honor is a conceptualized 
standard for behavior based upon socially honored values, which is viewed as favorable (i.e., 
honorable) when adhered to and uncommendable (i.e., dishonorable) when deviated from 
(Stewart 24).  Here, the distinction is that it is the values constituting the code that define the 
relevant notion of honor, not the other way around.  Honor is capable of changing hues, as it is 
redefined by what values it promotes.  Any given behavior may be awarded merit under one 
code of honor but discredited under another.  However, this is because what truly defines honor 
is its structure of socially elevating values, not any values it necessarily entails.   
The philosopher Aristotle in his The Nicomachean Ethics provides a description of 
virtues: virtues are the balanced center of morality, bookended by excess on one side and lack on 
the other, both of which are vices.  As stated in Book II.6: 
Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which 
depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or 
exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that 
which is intermediate. (Aristotle 31) 
Consider two hypothetical examples of Aristotle’s view.  A culture may concern itself with 
perpetuating honesty—but does this imply that every man, woman and child should patrol the 
streets, announcing their weekly income and the faults of their neighbors, or that one may tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but only when asked explicitly with no other 
option?  Second, consider what would be possible if a society were to elevate charity as an 
honored value, perhaps due to a prevalent religion in the region.  An average citizen’s heartfelt 
acts of service to a neighbor just as much as an opulently wealthy businessperson’s mindless 
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givings to a non-profit would both be equated to the same level of “honorable.”  While codes of 
honor can laud virtues, what they really promote are values, regardless of whether they are 
lacking or excessive. 
Paradoxically, both the excess and lack of a virtue can coexist, since both can qualify as 
an honored value if they are elevated for social emulation, as seen above.  For an illustration of 
this, look no further than William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.  In Act 3 Scene 2, Mark Antony 
delivers a scathing speech leveled at the Roman senators responsible for Julius Caesar’s 
assassination.  Shakespeare positions Antony’s words so as to both insult and revile them while 
still using what is typically understood to be a socially complementary word, “honor.”  Here, it is 
evident that Antony is attacking the senators for either, a) an ill-applied allegiance to one 
honored value (patriotism), or b) a complete disregard for that honored value (e.g., leaving 
Caesar alive would have been more beneficial to the stability of the republic).  The shades of 
meaning that being dubbed socially “honorable” can imply are demonstrable through this scene.  
Indeed, the great question of the play asks whether Antony or the senators are truly honorable in 
their allegiance to the welfare of Rome.  Even if one or all of them sincerely are, their allegiance 
to the honored value of fatherland produces opposite results in each of the men—to kill Caesar, 
or not to kill Caesar, that is the question.  In other words, how a value manifests within a culture 
is dependent upon how it is defined.  These deviations are unique to every value, but hopefully 
the concept is sufficiently summarized. 
Next, how are the terms Individual and Group defined?  The former is a code of honor 
that is defined or adopted by one person, whereas the latter is a code of honor that is defined, 
promoted and/or enforced by a group.  These are the two contexts in which honor operates 
(Stewart 25-26).  For instance, a member of a community may choose between either creating 
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their own code of honor, fully (a rarer occurrence) or partially, or they may choose to fully or 
partially adopt the same moral ideals as their neighbor (24).  (Group honor, then, tends to be the 
popular morality, sprung from whatever values are being presently esteemed by whomever has 
influence, whether the masses or a monarch.)  This is the choice presented to every person by 
their culture.  (This does not imply a moral relativism, but rather, the possibility of a person’s 
code of honor dissenting from the majority’s code of honor.)  Generally, however, when most 
people use the term “honor,” they are thinking of the Group setting.   
Fascinatingly, a “hero” is a direct result of this honor principle.  Heroes can emerge in 
two ways: either they become a renowned champion of the popular morality (e.g., the 
mythological warrior Achilles, when he is not protesting society by temporarily renouncing its 
ideal values: tîmê and kleos), or heroes embody revolutionizers, pioneering a code of honor 
(differing from that of the Group one) and becoming renowned for it (Homer bk. 1, 6, 9; 
Vandiver; Bowman 9-10; Sommers 20-25).  An example for this latter type of hero would be 
Martin Luther King, Jr., who may be described as a hero who successfully fought to elevate 
racial civil equality to the status of an honored value.  His heroism is especially visible in harsher 
contexts, such as the American South.  As supported by Carson Clayborne of Encyclopædia 
Britannica, “[his] words introduced to the country a fresh voice, a skillful rhetoric, an inspiring 
personality, and in time a dynamic new doctrine of civil struggle.”  Due to this civil struggle, if 
in the present-day United States a person in their Individual code of honor would choose to 
oppose the equality of civil rights for all races, the current Group code of honor would widely 
ostracize them.  Ultimately, Group honor is simply the amalgamation of many Individual codes 
of honor.  Group honor assumes a powerful momentum when individuals choose to 
automatically adopt it and not to create a personal code of honor that deviates too far from it.   
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All this theorizing is brought into relevance by honor’s real-world effects.  Above, a code 
of honor was defined as, “a conceptualized standard for behavior.”  As posited here, “behavior” 
is the application of honored values.  Behavior as an application of honored values means that 
codes of honor incentivize certain actions (Sommers 17, 25).  Since honor is a social system, 
those that share the same code of honor praise behavior that follows it and discourage behavior 
that disregards it.  The possible types of honor-driven behavior can be split into two primary 
categories: the Internal and the External.   
The deepest application of honored values is an individual’s internalization of them, 
which produces character-derived actions (Stewart 23-24).  Persons that do this act in consistent 
accordance with the honored values, regardless of whether other members of their honor 
community (those who adopt the same code of honor) are there to hold them accountable to these 
values.  Also, several persons may have the same code of honor (and therefore, the same values) 
yet execute obedience to them differently.  This may be explained by arguing that the more an 
individual holds a value to be a personal moral authority, the more that person obeys the value in 
all circumstances.  In other words, actions from the Internal symbolize an authentic belief in the 
values a person honors, meaning they can be expected to follow them even without witness.  
Typically, this is what is dubbed one’s “character,” whether positively or negatively. 
A secondary application of honored values is behavior that is amputated from what the 
individual truly feels about these values.  Instead, these External demonstrations of honored 
values are done for appearances’ sake, but they can range from shallow empty headedness to 
willful manipulation of the rest of the honor community.  Suppose there is an individual who 
does not authentically believe the values in their code of honor.  If one were to observe this 
person while they believed themself to be alone, the odds are that they would not choose the 
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same actions in consonant with these honored values.  Things done to “save face” or to maintain 
a “good reputation” are phrases that pull these familiar situations to mind (Stewart 25-28).  A 
nuance here is that a person of disciplined character may choose to act Externally as they “know 
they should” and wait for their heart to catch up with their honorable actions later, but this 
assumes some sort of private intention from a person and is thus virtually indiscernible from the 
outside.   
Regardless, to illustrate the divide between behavior in private and what is socially 
respected, consider this situation from Jane Austen’s Persuasion: the character Anne Elliot sees a 
letter that was not meant for her and contains sensitive information.  Anne realizes: 
She was obliged to recollect that her seeing the letter was a violation of the laws of 
honour, that no one ought to be judged or to be known by such testimonies, that no 
private correspondence could bear the eye of others. (Shapard 386)  
Despite her dishonorable behavior, Anne clearly has a sense of how propriety dictates she ought 
to behave, and she acknowledges this divide between that obligation and her discovery of 
another’s personal information. 
To summarize, a person’s behavior builds their reputation.  This behavior may stem 
either from true reverence for the values in their code of honor or from mere outward 
acknowledgement of them.  Also, a person’s code of honor may be either adopted from the 
Group or shaped at the Individual level.  As an aside, note that the value of individualism is 
distinct from the term Individual, as the latter describes the context in which a code of honor is 
held.  Also, individualism can be honored at the Group level when the behaviors that stem from 
it do not isolate single persons, but rather encourage self-reliance, courage, and the like.  This is 
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observable in American history (Bowman 80-86).  Either way, honor, functioning as a social 
system, can only be bestowed by others who share the same code of honor.   
It is important to note that there is a category of honorable External behavior that has 
very little to do with philosophically rationalized morality.  These are recognized as customs, 
traditions, cultural “norms,” titles, or polite manners.  All of these are certain staples of behavior 
that exist within cultures in a variety so incredible, they can seem absurd to those unfamiliar with 
them.  What are they?  These are External behaviors that have become a communal way of 
acknowledging honored values.  For instance, working again through the lens of Jane Austen’s 
novels, the society depicted in Northanger Abbey honors chastity.  When a family friend frowns 
upon some of the young men and women for their decision to travel unaccompanied, Catherine 
Morland is grateful that she had only done so once herself and rules that it was a mistake (73).  
There is nothing inherently unchaste about two single adults taking a carriage ride alone 
together, but doing so would be perceived by members of this honor community as an offense to 
that value, however indirectly.   
When these customs begin to be esteemed as values in themselves, they can undergo the 
transformation from innocently benign to threateningly dangerous.  If one could be imprisoned 
for committing a social faux pas, then one knows that an External behavior has been weaponized 
unnaturally.  Additionally, traditions can be a red flag for a culture’s change or decline from its 
honored values.  This occurs when a severance between common External behavior and the 
community’s actually honored values is widely detectable.  If, for example, one were to ask a 
mid-nineteenth-century layperson in England, “Why are unmarried men and women not to ride 
unaccompanied in carriages together?” and the answer is flatly, “That’s just the way it’s done,” 
then one knows that chastity itself is no longer acknowledged nor supported as a value of popular 
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morality in that person’s society.  Customs and traditions may be surprisingly effective at 
maintaining echoes of the honored value they represent; however, they cannot continue to persist 
within their honor communities without actual support from the members of the community. 
A touchy in-between of the two settings for codes of honor (Individual and Group) is 
religion, which claims some commonalities with each.  Religions (primarily Western ones) each 
view themselves as the exclusively correct system of belief concerning, among other things, the 
ideals for interactions between individuals (a part of morality).  Religions are, if you will, ready-
made sets of values which often compete to influence the overarching honored values in a 
culture.  Generally, religions prioritize in their codes of honor Internal behaviors, but they may 
just as equally list External actions in line with their purported values (such as liturgies and 
rituals).  As a distinction, conformity to culturally popular values is called “honor,” but 
conformity to religiously-promoted values is more aptly described as “piety.”  Piety may become 
an honored value depending upon the degree of the intersection between a society and its 
predominant religion.  This being said, the unavoidable trepidation in such an intersection 
occurring is that External behaviors are incentivized excessively (as in a theocracy).  The 
potential cause of this danger has two parts: first, religions (systems of belief) are meant to begin 
and initially take effect inwardly within a person, not begin as something External.  Second, 
however, glorifying a religion as a symbol of honor encourages unctuous outward 
demonstrations of it.  
This leads to a worthwhile statement concerning honor’s dangers. Honōris perīculī, as 
they may be called using Latin, stem from honor’s capacity for moral motivation and influence 
within a culture.  Dangerous cultures can form when a code of honor promotes values that 
encourage violent Internal or External behaviors.  (As a reminder, Internal behavior is action 
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driven by sincere belief in an honored value, whereas External behavior is superficial imitation 
of an honored value.)  Conversely, codes of honor can also contribute to dangerous cultures 
when the prevailing code of honor is unspoken yet harsh.  This can be a subtle lethality.  It is 
improbable if not impossible for honor to ever be fully extinguished, even when a society such as 
the interconnected North American and Western European one likes to think itself post-honor 
(Bowman 260-261).  Old customs may be abolished, new values may be instilled, but 
functionally, people interact with each other in the same way.  The workings of honor are still in 
existence even if they are not called such.  It is a self-deception for a populace to postulate 
superiority to their ancestors because “people today” have moved beyond honor.  This only 
serves to numb a culture’s sensitivity to the values they honor and to allow the opportunity for 
popular morality to become an easily received Trojan horse.  In addition, popular honor is an 
enticing answer to a person’s desire for community.  It satisfies the wish for acceptance with an 
offer of Group unity—one that can quite easily become uniformity or malevolent social control, 
if harnessed by a dictator or other controlling entity. 
Finally, here is a disclaimer to clarify how some miscellaneous derivative uses of the 
word “honor” are consistent with and fit into this honor theory.  Phrases that reference the social 
workings of honor are titles such as “Your Honor” for judges or statesmen.  By addressing 
someone as “Your Honor,” the implication is that they are a model replicator of the relevant 
honor ideals, and it is often attached to an office that is considered conjoined to a society’s 
morality.  Also, the very existence of “honors education” in the forms of classes and colleges 
indicates a societal elevation of advanced academics—the actual efficacy of such programs aside 
(Miner 79).  As for how this essay’s proposed honor system transposes to a massive social scale 
(such as international relations), many nuances are simplified and the only individuals that matter 
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are the ones directly representative of a colossal collective.  Ironically, this honor typically 
devolves to a primally simplistic you-punched-me-so-I-get-to-hit-you-back, “you started it” 
system (Bowman 171, 303).   
As a last example from a religion, the use of “honor” as verb, as in the Christian Bible’s 
“Honor your father and your mother” from Exodus 20.12a, or “Honor the Lord from your 
wealth” from Proverbs 3.9a, demonstrates the conferrence of honor to a person or figure (New 
American Standard Bible).  In the first instance, the sense is that of giving one’s parents the 
respect due them as if they were model imitators of the honored ideals of Christianity; the second 
example carries a slightly higher tone, given that Christianity views the Lord as the perfect 
executor of its honored values, and it seems to indicate a reminder to recognize the Christian 
God’s ideal standard for behavior (in this case, with one’s wealth).  Essentially, to honor a 
person, a person’s actions, or a person’s deity means simply to hold that thing in esteem as 
something worth respect, or, in some scenarios, emulation.   
In the end, the semantics of “honor” are significant and integrated evidence for this honor 
theory.  This being said, the intricacies of the word’s translingual etymology are expansive and 
scholarly—scholarly and expansive to such a degree that acknowledgement is the only due credit 
the topic can be afforded in this essay.  For further considerations of this, examine contemporary 
honor culture’s novel form of fame: celebrity.  (This is something commented on at length in 
Chapter Ten of James Bowman’s Honor: A History, named The Aristocracy of Feeling: Honor 
as a Celebrity.)  This concludes the list of miscellaneous uses of the word “honor.”  While there 
are many, they are each consistent with the provided theory of honor. 
Now it is necessary to summarize this discussion on the proposed honor theory as a 
whole.  There is great variation across the many historical functions of honor, but their 
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consistencies are identifiable as the framework of honor as a system, which is not the same as the 
rotating and fluctuating values honor assumes in these different cultures.  A society’s code of 
honor, obvious or unspoken, decides what is socially accepted and rejected.  All persons hold 
their own code of honor (Individual), which can be in varying degrees of alignment with the 
collective’s code of honor (Group).  What, then, is the purpose and function of honor as a social 
system?   It is a motivator.  Honor, as a motivator and social system, incentivizes certain 
behavior, whether Internal or External (Sommers 8, 13).  Certain behaviors are glorified based 
upon the values esteemed in a code of honor—most powerfully so as a popular morality.  The 
great—indeed, defining—consistency of honor is that it commends conformity and condemns 
contradiction.   
Argument: Ideal Values to Honor 
The exposition of this honor theory was necessary for the arguments to come because 
they use its structure.  (The arguments assume honor endemically motivates certain behaviors, 
among other details.)  The thesis to be proven is this: Personal Responsibility and Humility are 
the ideal values for a culture to honor.  The following arguments will begin by defining and 
parsing these values, then transition to revolve around how these two values interact with the 
principle of justice and with the pitfalls of religion.  The arguments also assert that Personal 
Responsibility and Humility are practically and morally the most beneficial values for a culture 
to idealize.  The reasons in support and refutation of these points will be organized around 
Aristotle’s aforementioned analysis of values in excess and in deficiency.  In addition, what 
behavior(s) are incentivized by a value, Internal or External, will be a key point of discussion.  
What is the criterion for grading the success of the two values of Personal Responsibility and 
Humility?  They must be proven capable of avoiding extremes of honorable behavior—both the 
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lack and the excess.  Extremes of honorable behavior can take many forms, but one of the most 
crucial to address is that of honor violence. 
First is the defense of Personal Responsibility as an ideal value for a culture to honor.  To 
begin with a definition, “responsibility” is “moral, legal, or mental accountability,” as defined by 
Merriam-Webster.  This definition plus the word “personal” yields the proper understanding for 
this value: Personal Responsibility is a person’s accountability for their committed actions.  
Next, as a moral value, its deficiency may be called carelessness and its excess controllingness 
(both of which will be addressed in further measure in Personal Responsibility’s refutation).  In 
order to justify labeling Personal Responsibility “ideal,” its primary benefit, its relationship with 
the principle of justice, and its persisting relevance to today will be defended. 
The primary benefit of Personal Responsibility as an honored value is that it preserves the 
base meaningfulness of honor as a system.  Since this value is more or less a person’s 
accountability for their committed actions, it aids honor in attaching merit or discredit to the 
responsible entity.  This fulfills honor’s function, since honor is a culture’s way of estimating 
each person’s general worth and distinction, also known as reputation (Bowman 202).  If honor 
could not be attached to an individual, then honor would have very little social function at all, if 
any.   
This is why some scholars, such as Frank Henderson Stewart or Tamler Sommers, label 
Personal Responsibility an endemic property of honor.  The latter of these two has asserted, “In 
honor cultures, taking responsibility is a bedrock moral principle” (Sommers 65).  This is a solid 
view, but the argument over whether or not it is an irremovable pillar of honor’s architecture will 
be put aside.  Independent of that debate, encouraging Personal Responsibility as a moral value 
is a higher issue.  For, by honoring Personal Responsibility as a value, an honored virtue is now 
  Ramsey 15 
 
created.  While this allows potential for its vices to be honored, it also allows the only possibility 
for its balanced virtue to be honored: a person voluntarily seeking to assume responsibility.  
However, failing to honor Personal Responsibility removes its entire range of inspired behavior 
from a code of honor.  If Personal Responsibility is excluded from the popular code of honor, 
then the discouragement of its corresponding Internal and External behaviors inevitably occurs.  
Acts of responsibility of any kind are left unrewarded, and no virtuous mean of taking 
responsibility would be celebrated either. 
What do Personal Responsibility’s Internal and External behaviors look like?  Recall that 
Internal action is driven by sincere belief in an honored value, whereas External action is 
superficial imitation of an honored value.  This means that regardless of why or how it is done, 
Personal Responsibility has the capability to motivate accountability for actions.  This is its 
primary benefit. 
Tamler Sommers is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Houston and 
holds a PhD in philosophy from Duke University (Sommers 0, 219-221).  In his recent book Why 
Honor Matters, he advocates for the implementation of restorative justice in tandem with a 
reinvigoration of healthy social honor, which he perceives as stifled by Enlightened liberalism in 
the Western world (7).  Within a section titled Home of the Shameless, he discusses Dick 
Miller’s coining of the word “affluenza.”  This is a term referring to some young Americans’ 
apathy towards or incapacity for taking responsibility for the consequences of their actions (63-
69).  Sommers agrees with Miller about the reality of such an observation and supplies his own 
solution.  This includes restoring social recognition of appropriate responsibility for the 
consequences of a person’s actions—even for consequences a person did not intend to incur.  
(This is a theme he returns to in his theory of justice, primarily in the chapters Honorable Justice 
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and Honor Contained.)  Sommers’ aspiration to renew accountability for actions in the next 
generation seeks to effectively sustain honor, as well as to avoid its lack: casual carelessness. 
Moreover, this carelessness that Sommers and I agree in advocating against is highly 
relevant.  It has for decades persisted within the United States of America, leading up to and 
during the years of the 1960s.  How and by what causes is substantiated by James Bowman, who 
is currently a resident scholar at the Ethics and Public Policy Center.  Within his Honor: A 
History, he provides a timeline of the cultural momentum towards the American sexual 
revolution—a period he labels as a turning point.  The probable causes he proposes for the rise of 
American irresponsibility are these: the increasingly flirtatious entertainment during both World 
Wars, the infamous Playboy magazine’s debut in 1953, the notion of radical “freedom” as a kick 
in the face to Communism, and the off-putting rigidity in the codes of honor of the Axis powers 
countries, principally Germany and Japan (Bowman 183-188).   
In the segment Sex and Freedom, Not Honor, the Goal of Life, Bowman argues that “guilt 
and sin” were remnants from the prior honor culture of America (Bowman 185).  This pre-
twentieth-century code of honor hearkened back to chivalry’s principle of Personal 
Responsibility.  (Chivalry is another code of honor from the past—one that enjoyed its heyday in 
Europe within the centuries of AD 900 to 1200 (Miner 40-44, 54-55).  However, from the 1300s 
and on, it has been more romanticized.)  As Bowman writes: “chivalry could not survive this 
change in social attitudes…sexual freedom and personal authenticity…were the new values of 
many in the postwar era” (185).  Note the distinction: personal authenticity, not Personal 
Responsibility, sexual freedom instead of self-regulation.   
In the 1960s’ United States, the consequence happened to be increased casual sex.  Such 
a change can be viewed either favorably or unfavorably.  What is undeniable are the 
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consequences of this shift.  The removal of Personal Responsibility as a social value permits the 
escalation (or even, extremization) of behaviors from other values otherwise policed by it (such 
as chastity).  This is not to mention the eventual destabilization of honor in the first place (not 
adhering to any values at all) due to Personal Responsibility’s removal.   
Thus, Personal Responsibility when honored as a moral ideal serves a dual purpose: it not 
only spearheads the preservation of honor as a structure, but as an addendum, it initiates a sort of 
social conscience surrounding flippancy or gravity of behavior.  While its lack is carelessness 
and its excess is controllingness, Personal Responsibility’s balanced mean is indispensable to a 
society.  This is because it not only inaugurates any conception of honor, but also, it is 
fundamental to any justice.  
Second is the defense of Humility as an ideal value for a culture to honor.   Its deficiency 
is identified as pride.  Its excess is more challenging to phrase, but it can be called self-
deprecation producing lack of ownership.  For the discussion of Humility, it is crucial to 
remember that the terms “lack” and “excess” are opposites, but both qualify as a “vice.”  This is 
in the sense that pride is the lack of Humility but is also a moral vice.   
However, before too deep a foray into this dense eight-letter word, something critical is 
needed: an accurate introduction and definition of the value as a whole.  For this, I turn to an 
author known for his argument against Humility’s foe, pride.  Indeed, the theologian C.S. Lewis 
presents a unique perspective on the vice, announcing it to be “essentially competitive” (Lewis 
122).  Lewis also asserts that Humility is pride’s full “opposite,” its antithesis (121).  Standing on 
Lewis’ logic, Humility must therefore be essentially noncompetitive.  If this is true, how can 
Humility be rationalized into a code of honor?  Does not honor as a system accredit and rank 
persons based upon behavior?  Well, as shall be substantiated, Humility offers unique benefits to 
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a code of honor.  Some of these are that Humility offers a social opportunity only it can provide, 
it is the supreme check-and-balance for honor extremes, and all this while not being 
incompatible with Personal Responsibility or justice. 
What is this unique social opportunity provided by Humility?  Lewis’ comment on those 
possessed by pride (Humility’s deficiency) provides an initial clue: “A proud man is always 
looking down on things and people: and, of course, as long as you are looking down, you cannot 
see something that is above you” (124).  By the phrase “above you,” the author is referring to the 
Christian God, a figure which, in his worldview, is worthy of emulation (i.e., honoring) because 
of His pure virtue.  However, regardless even of the author’s deity, this simple “above you” 
expertly communicates something: the danger of over-introspection encouraged by some values.  
Oddly enough, warped Humility is one of these.  There are two perversions of Humility: self-
deprecation or, paradoxically, over-absorption and obsession with the self.  The latter one is 
Humility’s lack.  To use Lewis’ words to describe this lack, becoming too involved with what is 
“down” deprives a person of discovering higher moral ideals “above.”   
What might an “above” moral principle be?  Humility too has a balance in between its 
deficiency and excess.  This balance is the accurate, uninflated perception of the self.  It allows 
for a special virtue only accessible via this balance: forgiveness.  Forgiveness, an “above” moral 
principle, is a derivative of Humility, and it is inherently beneficial to the theory of justice as a 
part of society.  This is because it introduces the foreign habit of examining one’s own good and 
bad marks, criticizing one’s own applause-driven External behavior, requisite to glancing and 
gawking at anyone else’s.  The author of the publication Ethics for Everyone, Dr. Michael W. 
Austin, a professor of philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University, has stated, “Humble people 
have better social relationships, avoid deception in their social interactions, and they tend to be 
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forgiving, grateful, and cooperative” (Austin).  The unique possibility of forgiveness is 
Humility’s primary benefit. 
Now, Humility’s moral deficiency, balance, and excess have been explained, but what of 
its behavioral abuses?  The idea of Humility’s abuse is a funny thing.  Specifically, as illustrated 
by the two types of behavior, Internal and External, Humility is socially quite difficult to abuse.  
Lewis posits that an authentically honest man, “will not be thinking about humility; he will not 
be thinking about himself at all” (128).  Theorize, then, about what a fake, External behavior 
seeking to emulate Humility for glory could look like.  Other than contradictorily bragging about 
one’s own humility or personal littleness, socially toxic things such as aggression or frequent 
jibes are not remotely within the definition of Humility.  Misuse of Humility is possible, 
certainly, but if its own extremes of pride (deficiency) and lack of self-assertion (excess) are 
regulated by another value, such as Personal Responsibility, it grows evident that the abuse of 
Humility is nigh impossible, if not fully so. 
The final point considering Humility’s benefits to a code of honor is its ability to be the 
supreme check-and-balance for honor extremes.  For this essay’s purposes, “honor extremes” is 
being used to refer to any honorable behavior that is taken to an unnatural extreme, whether 
Internal or External.  An example of an extreme behavior is honor violence.  In fact, this strength 
of balanced Humility is an extrapolation based upon what has already been established.  If 
Humility is the realistic acknowledgment of the moral bounds and responsibilities of the self 
(among other things), then it deftly fights the exaggerated sense of agency some values can 
potentially provide, such as Personal Responsibility. 
What has been said regarding the worth of Humility as an honored value boils down to 
this: balanced Humility provides unique opportunities and benefits for a system of honor.  These 
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are the possibility of forgiveness, which is compatible with justice and Personal Responsibility, 
and the capability to avoid violent honor extremes. 
All in all, Personal Responsibility and Humility are very arguably the ideal values for a 
culture to honor.  This is due to each contributing unique benefits to a society’s code of honor, 
especially and particularly together (as will be later emphasized and explained).  Personal 
Responsibility is fundamental to the functions of both honor and justice.  Humility is compatible 
with Personal Responsibility, and therefore, honor and justice as well, while also bringing 
something special to the table: forgiveness.  As will be further elaborated, they also meet the 
criterion of avoiding honor extremes. 
 
Table 1 – Examples parsing Personal Responsibility by degree and behavior type 
 Internal External 




consequences (likely for 
others) when convenient 




Excess Hypersensitive to 
community members’ 
irresponsibility as 
reflective on oneself 
When profitable, saying 
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Table 2 – Examples parsing Humility by degree and behavior type 
 Internal External 
Lack Belief that oneself is 
the most significant 
Demonstrations of self-
prioritization 
Balance Voluntary accurate 
assessment of oneself 




Pretense of personal 
insignificance 
 
Refutation: Religion and Justice 
Arguments in favor of these two values have been presented, but now the plausible 
objections must be equally recognized and responded to.  It is these refuting arguments that 
determine the vitality and fortitude of the thesis that Personal Responsibility and Humility are the 
ideal values for a culture to honor.  The arguments opposed to this thesis contend that these 
values do not sufficiently avoid honor extremes—the rubric for the success of these values.  
These assertions challenge Personal Responsibility and Humility’s capability to practically 
balance the other and whether their respective vices are worth the real-world risks of raising their 
virtues to honor.  This refutation is ordered the same as the supporting arguments, discussing 
Personal Responsibility first, then Humility.  Finally, the arguments will be brought into one key 
summary that addresses the two values’ compatibility. 
 Beginning with Personal Responsibility, the chief claim against it is that it is potentially 
over-assertive and obsessive.  The argument against this value claims it poses a threatening 
extreme of honorable behavior.  This over-assertion of responsibility is a relevant concern.  
Afterall, the mal-extension of responsibility means expanding responsibility for oneself to 
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include responsibility for others—not just for their vices, but even for their virtues.  In other 
words, not ownership of one’s own personal morality, but also ownership for others’ personal 
morality (Chesler).  This is essentially abused authority.   
Critics can posit that there are helpful and even kind instances of this: a father coming 
alongside a son to help bear a self-inflicted burden, or a caretaker assuming duties of an ailing 
person.  These examples, however, do not truly qualify.  In the first, a parent is aiding their child 
in their proper assumption of ownership for their own vices.  The latter demonstrates an assistant 
assuming responsibility for the minutiae and technicalities of life for an ailing person, not their 
moral responsibilities, however morally done.    
 No, the argument against Personal Responsibility because of its exaggeration is 
represented in the still persistent problem of religiously motivated honor violence.  This extreme 
of honorable behavior is often Internal (the violent individuals internalize and believe the value 
of perverted responsibility) but may also be External (the participating persons are violent for the 
sake of social status alone).  Occurrences of honor violence are observable primarily within 
countries containing a prominent Muslim presence.  A study titled “Social Hostilities Involving 
Religion” from Pew Research Center in 2011 details the relationship between Muslim presence 
and so-termed “social hostilities.”  Admittedly, this is tricky to quantify, but the researchers 
successfully delineated and defined four levels (“very high,” “high,” “moderate,” and “low”) 
utilizing Pew Research Center’s Social Hostilities Index methodology, which:  
…measures hostile acts by private individuals, organizations and social groups that 
restrict religious beliefs and practices. The 10-point index is based on 13 questions used 
by the Pew Forum to gauge the level of hostilities both between and within religious 
groups, including mob or sectarian violence, crimes motivated by religious bias, physical 
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conflict over conversions, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-
related intimidation and violence, including terrorism and war. (“Social Hostilities 
Involving Religion”) 
Most importantly, the results of the study detailed the following concerning religious social 
hostility: 
Countries with very high social hostilities have severe levels of violence and intimidation 
on many or all of the 13 measures that make up the Social Hostilities Index. In Iraq, for 
example, ongoing sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims frequently led to 
terrorist acts, including attacks on important religious sites in the country. For instance, 
more than 60 people died and more than 100 were injured on April 24, 2009, when two 
female suicide bombers attacked an important Shiite shrine in Baghdad, the Imam Musa 
al-Kadhim mosque. Many parts of the country also continued to have a lot of public 
animosity directed at religious minorities, including Christians, Yazidis and Sabean-
Mandaeans. 
The key link between these findings and perverted Personal Responsibility is summarized 
by the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay.  Corroborated by 
South Korean Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, on the 4th of March 2010 she delivered sobering 
remarks about these social environments: 
Most of the 5,000 honour killings reported to take place every year around the world do 
not make the news, nor do the other myriad forms of violence inflicted on women and 
girls...In the name of preserving family ‘honour,’ women and girls are shot, stoned, 
burned, buried alive, strangled, smothered and knifed to death with horrifying regularity.  
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Pillay continued to speak about the key exacerbating factor: perpetrators of honor violence in 
religiously hostile regions may be conferred special recognition or status within their 
communities, or even within their legal system.   
 These quotes show an extreme allegiance to honored values.  In these situations, one of 
the honored values must be Personal Responsibility, because the honor violence is committed 
against others as a reactive “justice” for their wrongdoing.  One example is allegedly forsaken 
chastity (Chesler).  Indeed, this is an excess of Personal Responsibility, where in the name of 
justice, young and middle-aged women are tortured and murdered for any variety of religious 
impropriety.   
 Particularly within Islamic culture, there exists a problem of men policing female family 
member’s perceived social virtue (a woman’s honor).  As Phyllis Chesler for Middle East 
Quarterly lays out, “Worldwide, 42 percent of [honor] murders were carried out by multiple 
perpetrators,” “worldwide, 58 percent of the victims were murdered for being ‘too Western’ 
and/or for resisting or disobeying cultural and religious expectations,” and (Chesler): 
…42 percent of the victims worldwide were murdered for committing an alleged “sexual 
impropriety”; this refers to victims who had been raped, were allegedly having extra-
marital affairs, or who were viewed as “promiscuous” (even where this might not refer to 
actual sexual promiscuity or even sexual activity). However, in the Muslim world, 57 
percent of victims were murdered for this motive as compared to 29 percent in Europe 
and a small number (9 percent) in North America. (Chesler) 
This perverse excess of Personal Responsibility is made manifest in its misdirection towards the 
violated rather than the violator. 
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All this being said, why would Personal Responsibility as a promoted societal and 
honorable value be wanted or welcomed at all?  Some genuinely awful consequences appear to 
be its result—where is the desirability?   
First, it must be recollected that honor violence is defined as an extreme behavior done 
for an honored value.  Extremes are capable of being regulated, and extremes are not always 
widespread.  It is relevant to restate that Humility does not allow a person to assert false 
authority on their neighbor.  What the Qur’an or the Bible may have to say about Humility is not 
at all necessary for this point.  By definition, if Humility were being honored as a social value 
alongside Personal Responsibility, these honor killings would be inconsistent with these 
communities’ codes of honor.   
For fair representation, it must be noted that while Muslim-dominated regions may have 
statistically evident problems with extremes of honorable behavior, Muslims that hold strictly to 
their faith are not necessarily more or less likely to approve of honor killings (“Muslim Views on 
Morality”).  An example of this is that an overwhelming majority of Muslims disapprove of 
sexual impropriety.  As found in a Pew Research Center survey in 2013: 
A strong majority of Muslims in nearly all countries surveyed condemn pre- and extra-
marital sex, including three-quarters or more in 29 of the 36 countries where the question 
was asked. This view is nearly universal in Thailand (99%), Jordan (96%), Lebanon 
(96%) and Egypt (95%). (“Muslim Views on Morality”) 
However, this does not evenly equate to approbation for violent behavior in response.  A 
wide swath of opinions exists in Muslim countries: 
In four of the seven countries where the question was asked in the Middle East-North 
Africa region, at least half of Muslims say honor killings of accused men are never 
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justified: Jordan (81%), Morocco (64%), Tunisia (62%) and Lebanon (55%)…But in 
only two countries in the region – Morocco (65%) and Tunisia (57%) – does a majority 
reject honor killings of accused women. In the other countries surveyed in the region, the 
percentage of Muslims who reject honor killings of women ranges from 45% in Lebanon 
to 22% in Iraq. 
As indicated by these statistics, in these Muslim regions the honoring of chastity does not 
directly equate to favoring honor violence as an answer to it. 
In the end, while connections can be made between cultures where a majority of honor 
violence occurs and Muslim-dominated countries, there is such statistical variation that via this 
data a critic cannot argue that Personal Responsibility always results in an extreme.  Even if this 
connection could be undeniably established, there is still a distinction in support of this essay’s 
thesis.  Codes of honor that incentivize individuals to breach their realm of authority and to 
impose consequences onto others are, by definition, not codes of honor that also esteem 
Humility.  Humility as a value nullifies this excess of Personal Responsibility by restraining 
individuals to their appropriate realm of moral authority.   
Transitioning to Humility and the refutation against it, this value’s central criticism rises 
from scholars like Tamler Sommers.  These arguments are rare, but they tend to involve 
interpretations of Humility that conflate its balanced mean with its excess.  For the sake of 
simplicity, this refutation will follow Sommers’ qualms with Humility. 
Sommers reasons that Humility is something that reduces self-importance, and that 
reducing self-importance abolishes meaningful justice between people (Sommers 134-145).  As 
he advocates, “You are what you’re willing to avenge” (qtd. in Sommers 142).  For fair 
representation of his opinion, it must be duly noted that he disavows vigilantism.  However, he 
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also does not define honor violence as an extreme in itself (143).  Overall, Sommers supports 
persons having a strong sense of self.  A strong sense of self, according to Sommers, in turn 
justifies the retribution of actions against the self.   
As presented in a review of Sommers’ Why Honor Matters by Aubrey C. Spivey in 
Reason Papers, Sommers stresses that those who “fail to take responsibility” are also those who 
“expect inherent respect” (88).  In Sommers’ view, both irresponsibility and the bestowal of 
unearned respect are reprehensible.  Also, from his perspective, the way in which irresponsibility 
and the granting of unearned respect occur is through an exploitation of the concept of human 
dignity (Sommers 26-28, 163-165).  If every person has inherent dignity, every person has 
inherent worth.  He argues that this idea makes it easy for persons to lazily claim that they 
deserve unfounded respect and, furthermore, that they are above the consequences of their 
actions.  Here, in his disapproval of dignity, Sommers mistakes the excess of Humility for its 
balance. 
In his dismantling of the value of human dignity, Sommers lists what are excesses of 
Humility.  Ironically enough, he does not think dignity and responsibility to be incompatible, but 
rather, he proposes Personal Responsibility as a check-and-balance for dignity (153-183).  As 
supported in The Nicomachean Ethics, “…the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort 
of ‘empty vanity’, and the deficiency is undue humility” (32).  There’s the rub.  Sommers’ 
misdefinition of “dignity” is really what is Humility’s deficiency.  Following this syllogism, it 
can be seen that Humility is not some great bearer of apathy.  Rather, Humility is capable of 
existing in excess—an excess perfectly restrained by Personal Responsibility, making it 
compatible with the principle of justice. 
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As a value pair, Personal Responsibility and Humility balance and mediate one another 
perfectly.  For instance, they even somewhat balance in vices (Table 1; Table 2).  Whatever 
damage could be done to justice by Personal Responsibility’s deficiency is opposed by 
Humility’s excess.  Whatever damage could be done to justice by Personal Responsibility’s 
excess is countered by Humility’s deficiency.  When both these values are esteemed in a 
culture’s code of honor, they are able to consistently and drastically compensate for each other.  
Hence, it can be argued that Personal Responsibility and Humility meet not only the rubric of 
avoiding honor extremes, but also of maintaining effective justice.  Personal Responsibility is 
apathy’s abolisher; Humility is pride’s tamer.   
Conclusion: Honor Now 
 The thesis of this essay is that Personal Responsibility and Humility are the ideal values 
for a culture to honor.  By arguing their success at avoiding honor extremes, I have applied my 
own honor theory, Tamler Sommers’ justice theory, pages of historical research, philosophical 
reasoning, and religious complexities.  Personal Responsibility and Humility had their lacks, 
means, and excesses examined.  These were then cross-examined by their ability to avoid honor 
extremes and to benefit society, demonstrating their nullification of honōris perīculī, or “dangers 
of honor.”   
 As a complex and elusive concept, I hope that in the very least I have been able to 
persuade my audience of honor’s present-day relevance.  Honor is powerful and can incentivize 
virtue or vices, lack or excess.  Without reaching for the past or romanticizing the present, I 
suggest that all persons ought to take stock of what values they hold dear and what behavior and 
actions they wish to see praised.   
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